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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
HUTH NEIGHBORS ADAM·s, 
Plaintiff a.nd Appellant, 
-vs.-
:B.,LORETTA LANG, 
Defendant a.nd Resp·ondent. 
Case No. 8141 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEl\IEN~r OF FACTS 
The plaintiff file·d an action to recover for personal 
injuries '''hich she sustained in an automobile accident 
on the 15th day of December, 1952, at about 6 :50 A.l\L 
on 1~. S. Highway 50 west of l\1agna and about one-fourth 
of a 1nile east of the Arthur Mill in Salt Lake County, 
(11. 1, ~' ~7). There were four persons, including the 
driver, in the car. The defendant was operating the 
car. The plaintiff was riding in the right front seat. 
Marjorie Jacques was riding in the middle of the front 
seat, and Robert Adamson was riding in the back seat, 
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(R. 144). The four occupants in the car \\Tere en1ployed 
at the Tooele ·Ordnance Depot, (R. 133). The vehicle 
'vas owned by Manuel Jacques, 1\Iarjorie's husband. ~r r. 
Jacques generally drove the car to and fron1 work, 
(R. 7 4, 75). However, on the morning of the accident 
he did not go to work and the defendant 'vas requested 
'by Mrs. Jacques to drive the vehicle, (R. 76, 119). Mrs. 
Jacques had first asked the plaintiff to drive the car, but 
she refused. Mrs. Jacques then drove the car to the de-
fendant's hon1e, (R. 140). There l\Irs. Jacques told the 
defendant that she would have to drive. The defendant 
did not want to drive, saying she would prefer to take 
her own ear, but Mrs. Jacques said that she "·ouldn~t 
drive and that the plaintiff refused to drive; that if they 
were going to get to work, the defendant 'vould have to 
drive; that her car was already warmed up and to take 
it. The defendant undertook to drive the car under 
these circu..lJlstances and in order that they could get to 
vvork, (R. 76, 141, 210). The plaintiff had agreed to pay 
I\fr. Jacques $1.00 a day for her transportation to and 
from the Depot, (R. 140). 
The accident occurred on a curve in the road. Photos 
we,re introduced showing the high,vay at the scene of the 
accident, (Exhibits 15, 16 and 17 (D) ). However, the 
guard ra.i'ls shown in the photos on the outside of the 
curve were not erected or in place at the time of the acci-
dent, (R. 83, 84, 111). A plat vvas also introduced in evi-
dence showing the highway and curve at the scene of the 
.accident, (Exhibit 28 (D) )~ It 'vas undisputed that the 
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3 
posted speed at the scene of the accident was 40 n1iles per 
hour and the sign so designating the speed limit is shown 
right at the curve in the photos and also on the road plat, 
(lL 92, Exhibits 15, 16, 17 (D) and 28 (D) ). 
It was dark at the time of the accident, ( R. 77). The 
lights on the car "\Vere properly burning, (R. 78). The 
car 'vas being opera ted at a speed of 35-40 miles per 
hour, (R. 79, 145). As it rounded the curve, it struck an 
icy spot on the road and started to slide to the left. The 
defendant let up on the gas feed and turned the car 
haek to the right. She did not at this time apply the brake 
for fear that the car 'vould go out of control, (R. 213). 
The car proceeded back to the right but continued toward 
the e1nbanlnnen t on the outside of the curve. The de-
fendant tried to turn the car back to the left, but it con-
tinued on the ice to the right. \Vhen the defendant saw 
that the car was not turning from the embankment she 
applied the brakes, but the car skidded on the ice to the 
right off the road and down the embankment, (R .. 81, 82, 
212, 213). From the time the car first started to slide 
until the ti1ne it left the road it was on ice, (R. 214). 
Counsel in his statement of facts claims that there 
'vere icy spots here and there on the road that morning 
and that it was also foggy. This is not a correct statement 
of the facts as they existed at the scene. There was no 
material disagreement between the parties as to the 
status of the weather, the condition of the highway or 
the speeld of the vehicle at the scene of the accident. 
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The plaintiff on cross exa1nination testified that 
the road seemed to be dry fro1n the time they left her 
home until the point of the accident; that she did not re-
call encountering any ice until the point of the accident, 
( R. 172) ; that they were traveling at a speed of "between 
35 and 40 miles per hour," (R. 145, 171). She admitted 
that there was nothing unusual or out of the ordinary 
including the speed about which the vehicle was being 
operated, (R. 173, 17 4). She ad1nitted that the defendant 
\vas driving carefully to her \vay of thinking, (R. 17-t ), 
and that prior to the time that the car struck the icy 
spot where the accident occurred, there had ·been nothing 
about the operation that caused her any alarm or con-
cern, (R. 175); that she had not con1plained or protested 
at any time about the 1nanneT in which the vehicle was 
being driven, (R. 171); that the first she noticed of any-
thing unusual was when the car encountered the icy spot 
and started to slide, (R. 177); that it hadn't occurred 
to her a.s they were riding along that there might he any 
ice on the highway, (R. 180); that the roads were fairly 
dry when they left home, (R .. 181); that no one prior to 
the tin1e of the accident had 1nade any mention about 
the possibility of any ice on the road, (R·. 181). She also 
testified on cross-examination that she didn't know 
whether there was any material fog at the scene of the 
accident, (R. 182), or whether it was li1nited to the area 
down by the canal at the ~fagna Junction, (R·. 182). 
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Mrs. Jacques testified for the plaintiff and said that 
they encountered fog at the Magna Junction by the canal, 
(R. 122). She didn't remember any fog a.t the scene of 
the accident to 1naterially interfere with visibility, (R. 
131). There was not enough fog at the scene to cause 
her any alarm or concern, (R. 132). She did not notice 
any sno\v or ice on the road surface, (R. 122, 123) ; she 
had not felt the car sliding prior to reaching the curve 
\vhere the accident occurred, (R. 123); she had not no-
ticed any icy patches, ( R. 128), and the road prior to 
reaching the scene of the accident was generally dry 
that morning, (R. 135). She testified that as they went 
around the curve there was "pro ba1bly a. place where the 
sun never shined, \Vas a patch of ice there, and we started 
to skid," ( R. 124). On cross-examination she testified 
that they hadn't encountered any ice on the road, nor was 
shP conscious of any ice or snow being on the road until 
the car started to slide at the point where the accident 
occurred. She \\~as just as startled as the others when 
the car started to slide and had not expected it, ( R. 133). 
\\i .. ith reference to the speed, she testified that they \vere 
traveling at a speed of "around 40 miles an hour," which 
\vas their custon1ary speed, ( R. 123, 133). There was 
nothing about the speed at which the car was being op-
erated that caused her any concern, (R. 132). 
The plaintiff called the defendant as a hostile wit-
ness. The defendant testified that there was slight fog 
at the Magna Junction, (R·. 78); that they were travel-
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ing at a speed of "between 35-40" or "not to exceed 40," 
(R. 79, 80, 180). She -also testified that there was no sno\v 
or ice on the road except at the point where the accident 
occurred, (R. 79, 82). 
As a witness in her own behalf, the defendant testi-
fied that the only fog of any consequence was encounter-
ed at the Magna Junction. There \va.sn't any fog at the 
point of the accident. She was traveling at a speed of 
35-40 miles per hour and did not see or encounter any ice 
or feel the car slip until they came around the curve 
where the accident occurred, (R .. 211, 21~). No one coln-
plained or protested as to the manner in \vhich she \vas 
operating the vehicle, (R. 214). She had driven over the 
sarne road the day prior to the accident going to and 
fro1n \vork and had encountered no snow or ice on the 
road, ( R. 221, 222). She drove over the road on that day 
at the sa1ne rate of speed as she was driving on the morn-
ing of the accident, and to her knowledge t;here was 
nothing different in the conditions on the 1norning of the 
accident than there was on the previous 1norning. It had 
not stormed or rained in the interim, (R. 222). 
Robert Adamson, the sole other passenger in the 
vehicle, was called as a witness on behalf of the defend-
ant. He testified that there \Vas no sno\v or ice on the 
paved portion of the road. They did not encounter any 
snow or ice until they rounded the curve \vhere the acci-
dent occurred, (R. 187). He did not notice any slipping 
or sliding of the car before it reached the point where 
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the accident occurred. There was no fog at the scene of 
the accident. He didn't notice any fog after the accident. 
He testified on direct examination that the defendant was 
traveling at a speed of 30-35 miles per hour "in that 
neighborhood" at the time she struck the icy spot, (R. 
188). On cross exainination he adinitted that he may 
have told plaintiff's counsel that the vehicle was travel-
ing at a speed of 35-40 rniles per hour, stating: "It is 
pretty hard to tell when you are riding in the back seat 
of the car," and that it may have been 35-40 miles per 
hour, (R. 194). 
Charles Paris, a Deputy Sheriff from ·salt Lake 
County, was called as a witness on behalf of the plaintiff 
and testified that he investigated the accident, (R. 87). 
He adinitted that after making his investigation and 
observing the condition of the highvvay, he Inade no ar-
rests and found no irnproper driving on the part of the 
defendant, ( R. 106, 107, 108, 114). 
The case was subn1itted to the jury on the issues of 
the negligence of the defendant and the con tributary 
negligence of the plaintiff, and the jury returned its ver-
dict in favor of the defendant and against the plaintiff. 
It is from this judgment that the plaintiff takes her ap-
peal. 
The resume of the evidence which we have given 
indicates there was little dispute between the parties as to 
the condition of the weather, the condition of the high-
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way, or the speed at . which the vehicle was being op-
erated. The facts simply showed, or at least the jury 
could so find, that the defendant was driving on a dry 
road at a speed of 35-40 1niles per hour \vhen she suddenly 
and unexpectedly encountered a patch of ice in the road 
on rounding a curve; that the car started to skid; that 
she acted reasonably to avoid the accident but without 
success. The skidding and accident came as a surprise 
to everyone. 
The appellant 1n her brief has a8~igned only one 
error, nan1ely, that the court improperly excluded cer-
tain testimony of an expert witness as to the speed of 
the defendant's vehicle based upon a hypothetical ques-
tion. Accordingly, the only question involved on this 
appeal is ·w·hether the court erred in excluding this testi-
Inony and our argument \Yill be directed to this point. 
STATEMENT ·OF POINT 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN EXCLUDING THE TESTI-
MONY OF AN EXPERT WITNESS AS TO THE SPEED OF 
THE VEHI·CLE BASED ON A HYPOTHETICAL QUESTION. 
(A) THE TESTIMONY ON SPEED WAS NOT PROPER 
REBUTTAL. 
(B) THE HYPOTHETICAL QU~STION- WAS NOT 
.PROPERLY FRAMED AND .INCLUDED ELEMENTS WHICH 
. . 
WERE EITHER NOT IN THE EVIDENCE OR HAD BEEN 
TO~D TO THE EXPERT OUT OF COURT .. 
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(C) THE PLAINTIFF'S ATTORNEY MADE NO OFFER 
OF WHAT HE EXPECTED TO PROVE BY THE ANSWER 
OF THE WITNESS TO THE QUESTION OF SPEED AND 
WITHOUT SUCH OFFER, THERE IS NO BASIS FOR CLAIM-
ING ANY PREJUDICE IN EX·CLUDING THE T·ESTIMONY 
OF THE WITNESS. 
ARGU~IENT 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN EXCLUDING THE TESTI-
MONY OF AN EXPERT WITNESS AS TO THE SPEED OF 
THE VEHICLE BASED ON A HYPOTHETICAL QUESTION. 
(A) THE TESTIMONY ON SPEED WAS NOT PROPER 
REBUTTAL. 
Speed \\·as one of the issues of negligence relied on by 
the plaintiff in support of her contention that the acci-
dent \vas caused by the defendant's negligence. The 
plaintiff, therefore, had the burden of proving as a part 
of her n1ain ca~e the speed at "\vhich she claiined the 
vehicle \Vas being operated and showing that such speed 
\Vas negligent under the circun1stances. The plaintiff 
testified that the vehicle \vas going 35-40 1niles per hour. 
1\Irs. Jacques, a passenger in the car, and one of plain-
tiff's \\·itnesses, testified that the vehicle was traveling 
around 40 n1iles per hour. The only other evidence on 
speed introduced by the plaintiff as a part of her main 
case was the testi1nony of the defendant which was 
brought out \vhen the plaintiff's attorney questioned the 
defendant as a hostile witness. The defendant testified 
that her speed was between 35 and 40 miles per hour. 
The plaintiff, therefore, based her case on speed on the 
ground that the vehicle was being operated at a speed 
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of not to exceed 40 miles per hour. The defendant in her 
case did not refute this clailn, and, as a matter of fart, 
the defendant admitted that she was traveling at a speed 
of 35-40 miles per hour not to exceed 40 miles per hour. 
R.obert Adamson was the only other witness testifying 
in the defendant's case as to speed. lie testified that the 
vehicle \vas going 30-35 miles per hour, but adn1itted 
that it 1nay have been going 40 1niles per hour. At any 
rate, the defendant personally admitted that the vehicle 
vvas traveling at a speed of 35-40 miles per hour and that 
is the 1naterial thing. This was the status of the evidence 
on speed when both parties rested their cases. It is 
therefore subn1itted that there was no 1naterial conflict 
between the parties on the question of speed. The de-
fendant in her case had not introduced any new or af-
firinative material on the question of speed. There was 
nothing for the plaintiff to rebut on the question of speed. 
Nonetheless, the plaintiff in rebuttal called S. S. Taylor, 
an expert \Vitness, and atten1pted to ask certain hypo-
thetical questions to obtain from him an opinion as to 
the speed at \vhich the vehicle was being operated. This 
"\Vas not and could not be rebuttal under the evidence as 
presented by both parties. If the expert was going to 
testify that the vehicle was being operated at a speed 
of 40 Iniles per hour, it was n1erely cumulative and would 
add nothing because all four occupants in the vehicle had 
already testified that the vehicle 'vas being operated at a 
speed of 35-40 n1iles per hour. If, on the other hand, the 
expert \vas going to testify that the vehicle was being 
operated at son1e higher rate of speed than 40 1niles per 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
11 
hour, then it certainly was not proper rebuttal testimony. 
\Vith the parties being in agreement as to the speed at 
vvhich the vehicle was being operated, there was nothing 
left for plaintiff to rebut at that stage. Furthermore, 
if the testi1nony were admitted for this purpose, it would 
be an atte1npt not only to refute the defendant and her 
vvitness, Adamson, but also to impeach and refute the 
testin1ony of the plaintiff and her witness, Mrs. J:a:eques. 
Certainly, after all of the evidence is in, the plaintiff 
in rebuttal cannot be permitted to introduce new evi-
dence based upon the testimony of an expert in ansvver 
to a hypothetical question, the sole purpose of which is 
to show that not only the defendant but the plaintiff 
and her \Vi tnesses \Vere in error and that the speed was 
greater than that testified to hy any of the parties. It 
\vas the plaintiff's burden to show excessive speed, and 
having based her claiin on a speed of 35-40 miles per 
hour, she could not in rebuttal atten1pt to sho\v a higher 
speed and refute her O\Vn testimony. 
See Sa ;uu.el Smith, et al. /c. J. M. Richardson et al., 
2 c·tah 424, \vherein the Utah Supre1ne Court in speak-
ing of rebuttal testi1nony said: 
"Rebutting evidence is such as explains or 
repels, rebuts or counteracts evidence that co1nes 
out on the defense. It may incidentally support 
the case made in the complaint, but tha.t is not 
rebutting testimony which mainly supports the 
ca.se stated in the complain.t and only incid1entally 
goes to explain or repel the evidence in behalf of 
the defense." (Italics ours) 
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See also 4 Nichols Applied Evidence, page 3926, Sec. 
"Evidence which mainly supports the case 
stated in the complaint and only incidentally goes 
to explain or repel the evidence in behalf of the 
defense is not rebuttal." 
See also 4 Nichols Applied Evidence, page 3927, 
Sec. 9: 
"It is within the discretion of the court to 
permit in rebuttal evidence \vhich should or might 
have been offered in chief, and statutes so ex-
pressly provide in many states. Admission in re-
buttal of testimony constituting proof in chief is 
not reversrble error, at least unless in case of 
abuse or discretion and prejudice. Bttt.t a party 
will not be allowed to offer evi,dence iJn rebu,ttal, 
which should properly ha.ve been offered. in chief, 
except by leave of court. Evidence, pa.rt of de-
fenda.nt' s case in chief, a,ttempte:d to be introdu,ced 
after they had rested and plaintiffs had' imtro-
duced their evidevnce in. rebuttal, was properly 
excluded." (Italics ours) 
See also 53 Am. J ur., page 106, Sec. 120: 
"After the parties have introduced their evi-
dence in chief they are as a general rule confined 
to rebuttal evidence, that is, evidence which an-
swers or disputes that given by the opposite party, 
-evidence in denial of some affirmative case or 
fact which the adverse party has attempted to 
prove,-except as the trial court may in its discre-
tion permit a party to introduce evidence which 
could have been given as part of the testimony in 
chief. One cannot, except in the discretion of the 
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trial court, ilntroduce as a pa.rt of his rebuttal 
testimony rela.tive to new ()Jnd ilndependent facts 
competent as a part of his testimony in chief. 
What is rebuttal evidence rests largely within the 
discretion of the trial court. * * *" (Italics ours) 
See also 53 Am. Jur., page 107, Sec. 121: 
"As a general rule, the party upon who-rn the 
affirmative of an issue devolves is bou-nd to gime 
all his evidence im support of the issue in the first 
irnstance, and will not be P'ermitted to hold back 
pa,rt of his evi.dence confirmatory of his ca.se and 
then offer it on rebuttal. Rebu.ttal testi.mony of-
fered by the pla.intiff should rebut the testimon(jj 
brought out by the defendant and should consist 
of nothing which could have been offered in chief. 
And unless the court in its discretion dispenses 
w·ith the requirement, the d.efend'a;nt, as well as the 
plaintiff, should introduce all his evid.ence im 
chief in support of his main ca.se. But the trial 
court may, in its discretion, permit the introduc-
tion of such evidence on rebuttal, and an appellate 
court will not interfere except in cases of clear 
wbuse of discretion. Nor, as a general rule, will 
the discretion of the trial court in refusing to 
permit evidence in chief to be introduced in re-
buttal be interfered with, and in some jurisdic-
tions the appella.te courts will not review this 
discretion. * * * " (Italics ours) 
It is clear from all of the authorities cited that the 
testimony which the plaintiff sought to develop froin the 
expert witness in rebuttal was not proper rebuttal. If it 
had any place at all in the case, it should have been in-
troduced as a part of the plaintiff's main case. Further-
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more, the effect of the testin1ony sought to be introduced 
was to tell the jury that the defendant was wTong, that 
the plaintiff was wrong, that the two passengers in the 
vehicle "\vere wrong, and to urge them to dis believe the 
driver and occupants in the vehicle including the plaintiff 
and to find some other or different speed based upon 
the testimony of a person "\Yho wasn't even thrre and who, 
it would be argued, knew more about the case than either 
the plaintiff or the defendant or the other two passengers 
in the vehicle. The evidence was not proper rebuttal. 
The plaintiff in rebuttal should not be permitted to iin-
peach her own witnesses under the guise of rebutting 
testimony offered by the defendant. 
(B) THE HYPOTHETICAL QUESTION WAS NOT 
PROPERLY FRAMED AND INCLUDED ELEMENTS WHICH 
WERE EITHER NOT IN THE EVIDENCE OR HAD BEEN 
TOLD TO THE EXPERT OUT OF COURT. 
In rebuttal the plaintiff called S. S. Taylor and had 
hiin identify a 1nap which he had drawn "\Yhieh was mark-
ed as Exhibit 24 (P), (R. 239). This map, an1ong other 
things, contained a dotted red line purporting to show 
the arc or route of the vehicle fro1n the ti1ne it struck 
the ice until it left the high,Yay and overturned. 1\{r. 
Taylor admitted that he kne"\v nothing about the mark 
shown on the dotted red line and that the path \Yas 
pointed out to hin1 by someone else; that the course \Yith 
respect to the dotted line "\Vas not based upon his o'vn 
kno,vledge, but on 'vliat so1neone else had sho,vn hin1. 
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The 1nap ''Ta::-; adrnitted in evidence except for the dotted 
line \vhich \Yas excluded, (R. 240, 241). The first hypo-
thetical question which counsel fran1ed was as follows: 
"Q. Assu1ning that vve had a standard 1941 Pon-
tiac sedan coupe with three ladies in the front 
seat and one 1nan in the back seat, with the 
accelerator off, that left the paved concrete 
portion of the Magna-Garfield highway on 
the south side, just west of the culvert, as 
indicated on the plats and on the photographs 
that I have sh.au'n yoH-
niR. ~TRONG: I will object to that; there are 
no things illustrated on the plat or on the 
photograph as to vvhere the car left the road. 
::JIR. :J[QSf-5: I subn1it, your Honor, it has been 
testified to by witnesses; 
Q. ..A.nd I a1n showing you photographs 11, 12, 
and 13 (P), \Vhich have been admitted in 
evidence ; do you recognize tlie area in the 
photograph~ I have asked you that before~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. \Vere you present when they were taken~ 
A. Yes. 
l\IR. STRONG: Going to rnake further objection 
to all this testirnony, your Honor, on the 
ground that it is testi1nony that should have 
been given on his first case. It isn't proper 
rebuttal testimony, and I object to any fur-
ther testirnony. It is just an attempt to re-
open the whole thing, and should have been 
testi1nony given in the rnain case. (R. 2-t-~) 
I 
I 
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MR.. M·OSS: I submit, your Honor, this is the 
proper place for admitting it. Mr. Strong 
has come forward with testimony now of his 
witnesses that- the car was travelling at a 
slower rate of speed-that is, thirty to thirty-
five-and one witness, thirty-five to forty. 
(Argument.) 
THE COUR·T : Well, there is nothing now before 
the court. Counsel started to ask a hypotheti-
cal question, then he injected some photo-
graphs and stuff, which, as the record stands, 
would have to be included within the hypo-
thetical question. 
MR. STRONG: Go ahead and ask the question. 
THE COURT: If you want to ask the hyl>O-
thetical question, Mr. Moss, you better start 
it over now. 
MR. MOSS: Well, we will start over again. 
Q. Mr. Taylor, I ask you a hypothetical ques-
tion: Assuming that a standard 1941 Pontiac 
coupe, with three ladies in the front seat and 
one man in the back seat, with the accelerator 
off, left the paved concrete portion of the 
Magna-Garfield highway on the south side, 
just west of the culvert, as is indicated on 
Exhibits 11, 12 and 13 ( P), which are ad-
mitted in evidence and as shown on Exhibit 
24 (P) and Exhibit 28 (P), both of which 
show the culvert area; and, assuming that 
that car, leaving tlie highway at that point, 
descr~bed an arc on the sho·ulder or embank-
ment of the road shown on sketch 24 (P) 
over frozen ground and frozen snow, with-
out apparent side slippage diagonally across 
the dirt and paved portion-
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THE COURT: Mr. Moss, in the interest of time, 
that involves some matters that are not in 
evidence, and therefore the question, as it is 
formed up to this time, would be objection-
able. 
l\IR. MOSS: \Vhat part, your Honor, do you think 
TI-IE COUR.T : The arc you refer to on the last 
exhibit. (R. 244) 
~IR. N[OSS: Well, that-Officer Paris has testi-
fied to that arc, your Honor. 
~rl-IE COl~RT: Officer Paris, as far as it appears, 
hasn't even seen that Ina p. 
}.{R. ~lOSS: Yes, but he has testified to it as 
~r r. Taylor testified he took it-. 
TTII~~ ( iOl~RT: Yes, but, 1tfr. 1foss, this man can't 
lllake a drawing from what somebody else told 
him they testified to and then use it as part 
of the evidence. 
~[R. l\l'OSS: I \vill relate it to the dra\\ring, your 
Honor; 
Q. -described an arc as is shown on the chalk-
~IR. STRONG: Starting another-
~[R . .JiOSS: No, this is continuing the same ques-
tion, back to the arc part. 
niR. STRONG: I am going to object; I mean, he 
has got to reframe the question because he 
has got something in there now that I did not 
stipulate to-the arc he referred to on that 
exhibit. It is improper unless it is taken out. 
So, at this stage, the question has got to be 
refrained. 
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MR. MOSS: We will ignore the last plat. \Ye \vill 
use the chalk drawing. 
MR. S·TR.ONG: You have got it in your question. 
MR. MOSS: Well, I will ask that part be stricken. 
MR. STRONG: No, I want you to start so I will 
lrnow what the question is. 
MR. MOSS: I thought you were interested in 
time. 
'THE COURT: You better start over on your 
question. ( R .. 245) 
Q. Mr. Taylor, let's assume the following facts-
not relate:d to any drawing on the board, just 
assume the following facts: That a 1941 
standard Pontiac sedan coupe with three 
women in the front seat and one man in the 
back seat, travelling westward on Higlnvay 
50, at a point that is-approximately a point 
a quarter of a mile east of Arthur ~lill and 
proceeding upgrade on that road of approxi-
mately four per cent; assume that that car, 
with the accelerator off, left the paved por-
tion of the cement highway, and travelled to 
the left of the highway up onto a bank-a 25 
per cent gravelled bank-that had some snovv 
on it, and described an arc across that bank 
that was 90 feet in length fron1 the point 
where the car left the high.way to the point 
where it returned to the highway, and the 
highest point of the arc was nine feet frorn 
the edge of the concrete to the right wheel or 
inside wheel of the car; and, then, assu1ne 
that no brakes were applied during that tilne 
and there is no indicated side slippage during 
that time; assume that that car returned to 
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the concrete portion of the highway and pro-
ceeded froin the point where it went onto the 
concrete portion a distance of 47 feet in a 
northwesterly direction across the highway; 
and assume that there are no marks on the 
highway showing any application of brakes; 
and assume the highway is clear at that point 
-that is, the surface not covered with ice or 
snow; an1d assume that car, after travelling 
47 feet across the highway and the shoulder, 
"~ent off of an e1nbankment at approximately 
15 n1iles an hour; and assun1e that that car 
landed at the bottom of the cliff on its nose 
and did not drag down the face of the shoul-
der, and, having landed on its nose, turned 
over onto the top of the ear onto a railroad 
track, \vhich is approximately - a railroad 
track \vhich lay twelve feet beyond the face 
of the cliff-you get those~ Assuming those 
to be facts, can you, by calculation, tell me 
the speed at which that car would be travel-
ling in order to traverse that area as de-
scribed. ( R. 246) 
~IR. STRONG: I object to this question on th·e 
ground, incompetent, irrelevant, and im-
Inaterial. It is not proper rebuttal testimony. 
It is testimony that counsel could have gone 
into in the n1ain case. I will object to it on 
the further ground that it is not assuming 
all of the facts in the evidence, that there is 
no coinpetent evidence in the record to assume 
it was a four per cent grade. The only testi-
mony on that is based upon a map from the 
State Capitol, without any investigation or 
1neasurements Inade at the scene, and, further, 
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it is based on the assu1nption that no brakes 
had been applied, and there is testiu1ony in 
the case that brakes had been applied. 
MR. MOSS : This is a hypothetical question. 
MR. STRONG: I know, but you have got to con-
form to the evidence. 
MR. MOSS: Assu1ne certain facts, and the jury 
is permitted to determine whether or not 
those facts are in evidence. 
THE COURT: ·Objection "~ill be sustained." 
(Italics ours) (R. 247) 
The first atten1pt of the plaintiff to ask the hypo-
thetical question was never finished and the plaintiff's 
attorney voluntarily refran1ed it. There is no basis for 
complaint at this stage. The second attempt at the hypo-
thetical question referred to an arc or curve as shown 
on Exhibit 24 (P). This arc or curve in Exhibit 24 (P) 
had been previously excluded since it was ad1nittedly 
based upon hearsay evidence. F·urthermore, the hypo-
thetical question at this stage was never finished. 
All of the authorities are in agreernent that a hypo-
thetical question cannot be based upon 1natters 'vhich are 
not in evidence. See Sta.te t:. Lingman, 97 Utah 180, 91 
Pac. ( 2d) 457, \V herein this Court said: 
"We do not consider it necessary to further 
discuss this question, save to advance the adinoni-
tion th·a t the court and counsel should be careful 
to see that a hypothetical question presents or 
assun1es no fact that is not in evidence; that it 
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does present all facts or elements necessary to the 
deter1uination to be n1ade by the witness, or to 
enahle hirn properly to form an expert opinion; 
and that no material ele1nent or fact is used by 
the witness in his detern1inations that is not pre-
sented in the question as asked." 
See also 3 Jones Co nun en taries on Evidence, Sec. 
1326, page ~± :25 : 
~'If there is no testin1ony in the case tending 
to prove the facts assu1ned in the hypothetical 
question, such question is irnproper. * * *" 
The third atten1pt at the hypothetical question, 
an1ong other thing~, referred to a +% grade concerning 
"·hich there \Ya~ no testi1nony in the case and, therefore, 
no l>asi~ for that portion of the hypothetical question. 
'J'lJc enurt l)roverly sustained the ohjection not only 
be,·n n~e it \Yas not proper rPbuttal testin1ony, but because 
the hypo~hetical question '"·as not properly fran1ed and 
con tainl·d infor1na tion \\·hich \vas not in the record. 
Thereafter, the plaintiff had the exvert Taylor testi-
fy that lH· 1nea~ured the grade at the scene of the accident 
at -1-/c, (I\. ~-~7, :248). lfe then atternpted to add on 
to hjs previous hypothetical question as follo,vs: 
··Q. Four per cent. .L4nd, haPin.(J lzad those factors 
p,oirn.ted out to you and a,n a.rea of the hillside 
described by-~ 1rhat JJerson zras that? 
_A_. Sheriff Paris. 
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Q. Sheriff Paris; did you n1ake a cornputation a~ 
to the speed that the Pontiac automobile had 
to be travelling iJn ord:er to go over the cliff 
and land in the position it did, as described 
by 0 fficer Paris? 
MR. STR.ONG: Just a minute, I will object to 
the question on the ground, incompetent, ir-
relevant, and irnmaterial; it isn't proper re-
buttal testimony; furthern1ore, it is based 
upon hypothetical questions that were given 
on information pointed out by officers at the 
scene when Sey1nour Taylor was out there. 
It isn't based upon any testimony-
THE COUR·T: The objection is sustained. (I{. 
248) 
MR. MOSS: Well, I don't know ho'v a hypo-
thetical question can be based on anything 
else. 
(Argument.) 
THE C·OURT: Mr. Ross, the witness can not be 
asked a hypothetical question-
ME. MOSS : The name is "Moss". 
THE COURT: -of matters he hears out of court 
and which he doesn't-or which isn't in this 
record, in the first place; second place, it isn't 
rebuttal. 
MR. MOSS: He can be a.sked a hypothetical ques-
tion based on facts which are in evidence, 
your Honor. 
THE COURT: The objection is sustained." 
(Italics ours) 
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At this stage the plaintiff's hypothetical question 
called the expert's attention to certain things pointed 
out to him at the scene of the acci<lent some tin1e later 
by Officer Paris and as described by Officer Paris to 
the expert witness. These descriptions were not part of 
the record. There was no evidence as to what Officer 
Paris had ever pointed out to the expert. It was wholly 
in1possible to know what condition or things the expert 
had in mind as having been pointed out or described to 
him by ·Officer Paris. The objection to this hypothetical 
question was properly sustained. 
See 3 Jones Commentaries on Evidence, Sec. 1335, 
page 2-t--!2 : 
··The general rule against the consideration 
of hearsay by a judicial tribunal finds no excep-
tion in the case of expert witnesses. While, as 
stated in preceding sections, expert opinions 1nay 
in son1e cases be based upon personal knowledge 
gained from observation or exa1nination, the 
rule is well established that hearsay in the forn1 
of information gained from the state1nents of 
others outside the courtroo1n is not such personal 
kno\\rledge, nor may it be the basis of an expert 
opinion. * * *" 
See also 3 J'ones Comn1entaries on Evidence, Sec. 
1330, page 2433 : 
"Opinions sought 1nerely upon testin1ony 
heard or read by the expert, and without re-
staten1ent and limitation of the facts, are un-
doubtedly open in the great majority of cases to 
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the objection that the witness, ho,vever conscien-
tious, will not found his opinion upon all thP faets 
but only upon those which his personal belief in-
·duces him to assume as true. When he is called 
upon to form an opinion upon testimony which 
he has heard or read, the witness unconsciously 
passes upon the weight of the evidence or credi-
bility of other witnesses, and, in detern1ining the 
facts, in effect usurps the province of the jury. 
. . ., 
'See also II Wigmore on Evidence, Sec. 681: 
"The same objections apply to the question, 
'On what you have heard of the testimony in. this 
case, wh'at is your opinion~'; \Vith the additional 
objection that it is here still more difficult to 
understand the premises actually in the witness' 
mind, since no one else kno,vs exactly ho\v 1nuch 
he has heard." (Italics ours) 
'The plaintiff's attorney then merely stated: 
"Q. Mr. Taylor, do you have an opinion in this 
matter~ 
1\fR. STRONG: As to \vhat ~ 
MR. MOSS: Opinion as to speed. (R. 248) 
MR. STRONG: Just a minute, I will object to 
that on the grounds incompetent, irrelevant, 
ana immaterial ; not proper-
THE COURT·: Sustained, on the ground it is 
wholly irrelevant. 
MR. MOSS: All right, that will be all; thank 
you." (R. 249) 
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No further questions 'vere asked. No further wit-
nesses were called. The plaintiff never made any request 
to re-open the ease. If the expert had an opinion, it was 
\Vholly inunaterial. The four occupants in the ear, includ-
ing the plaintiff, who sh.ould know n1ore about the speed 
than anyone else, had testified without disagreement that 
the car 'vas being opera ted at a speed of 35-40 n1iles per 
hour-not to exceed 40 n1iles per hour. If the expert was 
going to testify to the sa1ne speed, it could add nothing. 
If the expert was going to testify to a higher speed, it 
was not proper rebuttal. 
Counsel at page 3 of appellant's brief states that an 
expert 'vitness 1nay be asked a hypothetical question 
based partly on his personal observation and partly on 
the pre1ni~e provided by the hypothesis. vVith reference 
to the experfs personal knowledge, this Court has made 
tL(\ follo''Ting comment in the case of Xenaki.s v. Garrett 
F're;.r~lzt I~ines, 265 Pac. (2d) 1007, at 1010: 
···x: •:i: * \V-e are in accord with the generally 
recognized rule that when the 1uaterial facts are 
\vithin the expert's own knowledge and are related 
hy hi1n in his testi1nony, his opinion 1nay hP based 
upon such personal observations and knowledge, 
'vithout necessarily having the facts hypotheti-
cally stated. lT et it is oln~iotts that the co1crt and 
jury must be m.ade aware of the facts upon u·hich 
the e.rpr1·t bases his conclusion, ofheru·ise the 
tcstinz ony would be of little assistance, wnd there 
would be no wa.y of testing the calidity of his 
O}Jin.ions. ***"(Italics ours) 
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We subn1it that there was no error 1n refusing to 
permit the exp·ert t~o testify in answer to the hypothetical 
question for the reasons aforementioned, and in addition 
thereto, because the facts on which the· hypothetical ques-
tions were based were in any event found against the 
plaintiff by the jury's decision. There was a dispute 
as to the course the vehicle took, and particularly whether 
the vehicle merely went onto the gravel shoulder to the 
left or up onto the bank as conten:ded by plaintiff's 
counsel, and whether the highway was covered with 
ice during the entire point of the skidding. These points 
1nust be deemed as having been decided in the defendant's 
favor by the jury's decision. Therefore, at least three 'Of 
the material points on which the plaintiff's counsel based 
his hypothetical question were found against him. By the 
jury's decision the premises for the hypothetical ques-
tion were not established and there could he no prejudice 
in the court refusing to permit the expert to testify. See 
II Wigmore on Evidence, Sec. 680: 
"* * * It f'ollows as a necessary part of the 
theory, that if the premises are ultimately re-
jected by the jury as wntrue, the testimonial con-
clusion based on them must also be disregarded." 
(Italics ours) 
The propriety and soundness of the hypothetical 
questi1on should in any event be left in the sound discre-
tion of the trial judge who is, of course, more familiar 
with the situation. S·ee II Wigmore on Evidence, Sec. 
682, page 810 : 
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"' * * * The trial judge should be given discre-
tion to deterrnine how far the counsel can and 
rnust properly limit his questions, and how far 
the jury Inay be trusted, with the aid of argurnent, 
to discover the cnnditional nature of th·e question." 
See also Tracelers Insurance Company c. Drake, 
89 Fed. (2d) 47: 
723: 
""The scope of the hypothetical question is left 
to the sound discretion of the trial judge. * * *" 
See also Ch~ristia1nsen v. H olli.ngs, 112 Pae. ( 2d) 
••':\: * * l\1oreover, the appellate court is justi-
fied in placing con~iderable reliance upon the 
deter1nination of the trial judge in passing on the 
sufficiency· of the facts narrated in the question. 
\\~eaver v. Shell Company, 34 Cal. App. 2d 713, 
94 Pac. 2d 364; Graves v. Union Oil Co., 36 Cal. 
..:\pp. 766, 173 Pac. 618. * * *" 
The record conclusively shows that the hypothetical 
que~tions \\-ere not properly fra1ned, included hearsay 
evidence, and \Yere based upon facts not in the record, 
and the trial court properly excluded the same. 
(C) THE PLAINTIFF'S ATTORNEY MADE NO OFFER 
OF \VHAT HE EXPECTED TO PROVE BY THE ANSWER 
OF THE WITNESS TO THE QUESTION OF SPEED AND 
\VITHOUT SUCH OFFER, THERE IS NO BASIS FOR CLAIM-
ING ANY PREJUDICE IN EX·CLUDING THE TESTIMONY 
OF THE WITNESS. 
As "\Ve have heretofore indicated, the plaintiff's at-
torney made no offer of "\vhat he expected to prove by 
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the ans"\ver of the witness to the hypothetical question. 
It is i1npossible to tell fron1 the record in this case 
"\Vhether the expert witness was going to testify to the 
speed already given by the other parties, to-"\vit: 35-40 
n1iles per hour, or whether he was going to testify to a 
higher or a. lower speed. 
Rule 43 (C) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
provides as follows: 
"In an action tried by jury, if an objection to 
a question propounded to a witness is sustained by 
the eourt, the exa.minirng a.ttorney may 1nake a 
sp·ecific offer of what he expects to prove by the 
answer of the witness. T;he court 1nay require the 
offer to be made out of the hearing of the jury. 
·The court may add such other or further state-
lnent as clearly sh·ows the character of the evi-
dence, the form in which it was offered, the objec-
tion made, and the ruling thereon. In actions tried 
without a jury the same procedure 1na.y be follo\v-
ed, except that the court upon request shall take 
and report the. evidence in full, unless it clearly 
appears that the evidence is not aillnissible on 
any ground or that the "\vitness is privileged." 
(Italics ours) 
The purpose of the rule is to per1nit an attorney to 
make a record on "\vhat he expects to prove in order that 
he 1nay USe the Saine as a basis for appeal. t:nder this 
rule it 'vas the duty of the plaintiff's attorney, if he de-
sired to pursue the rnatter furtheT or use it as a basis 
for appeal, to explain to the court what he expected to 
prove by the \vitness and either give the court an oppor-
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tuni ty to perrni t the evidence to come in, or to further 
state the court's basis for its objection to the testin1ony. 
liaving failed to do so, it would be rnere speculation for 
this court to deter1nine what the plaintiff expected to 
prove by the witness, and \Vithout knowing the speed 
to \V hich the expert \Vas going to testify, there certainly 
could be no basis for claiming prejudicial error in the 
court's refusal to per1nit the expert to testify. Therefore 
there is nothing in the record on appeal to show that the 
plaintiff could have been prejudiced in any event by the 
courfs refusal to permit the expert \vitness to testify. 
CONCLUSION 
We submit that it was not error on the part of the 
court to exclude the testimony of the expert \vitness as to 
:Speed hecause-(A) The testi1nony on speed \Yas not 
proper rebuttal; (B) The hypothetical questions \Vere 
never properly frarned and included elements which were 
~.·ither not in the evidence or had been told to the expert 
out of court, and (C) Because no offer of proof \vas 
1nade, th~ record fails to disclose any possible prejudice 
on the part of the plaintiff to the exclusion of the testi-
Inony. The exclusion of the testimony was \vithin the 
sound discretion of the court, and on the record in this 
case the lower court could take no other action. 11he 
judg1nent should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RICH & STRONG, 
Attorneys for Defendant and 
Respondent. 
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